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I. INTRODUCTION 
Three years since the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis and two years since the 
global markets’ turmoil following the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the US government’s 
bail-out of AIG, reforming the regulatory structure for financial institutions and platforms has 
achieved some visible progress. Though the new architecture is far from being finished, the main 
challenge is to implement what has been agreed upon in commitments and framework legislation, 
without losing track of the target to soundly improve global financial stability and effectively re-
solve future global crises on its way. 
Against this background, this paper examines the emerging new regulatory framework of financial 
institutions in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010, focusing in particular on 
macro- and micro-prudential, capital market and related reform initiatives of the G20 and the FSB, 
of the US and the European Union, 
and will:  
 Review the crises impact on the prevailing framework for safeguarding global financial stability. 
 Identify key proposals in the economic literature where financial-system reforms are necessary. 
 Focus on the following key stakeholders / platforms for international cooperation  
 the G20 and the FSB; 
 the US; and  
 the European Union (EU). 
 Determine recent and prospective reforms of each of these stakeholder. 
 Compare the following measures in a schematic overview 
 Macro-prudential supervision and systemic risk; 
 Micro-prudential supervision / Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) and 
cross-border crisis resolution; 
 Capital and liquidity requirements; 
 Capital Markets ( OTC Derivatives, Credit Rating Agencies); 
 Hedge Funds / Securitization; 
 Consumer /Investor Protection; 
 Remuneration; 
 Insurance. 
 Analyze the degree of convergence of the reforms in the before mentioned areas. 
 Assess outstanding aspects to improve the functioning and governance of the global financial system, and  
 Wrap up with key conclusions. 
In summary, the conclusions of this paper are that  
 The crisis is the catalyst of the new upcoming architecture that would not have emerged 
that way without the crisis; thus it has produced a first progress;  
 International cooperation is the hallmark to trigger reforms for preventing future crises; 
 International institutions must more closely cooperate on the reform and the perfor-
mance of the global financial system; so must supervisory authorities and regulatory bo-
dies. No other global financial architecture is up to the task and is politically feasible at 
this time; 
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 Concerns that reforms might expel financial markets away from the Europe and the US to-
wards less regulated playing fields do not seem realistic as long as they are not distorting and 
do not hinder banks flexibility and initiatives. 
II. LITERATURE OVERVIEW  
The basic source for research used for this paper were the official websites and research engines 
of the FSB, the G20 Summits Information Centers, the ECB website, the databases for the EU 
(www.europa.eu), and for the USA the US Government Printing office, the Treasury, the Senate and 
other US Government ressources. The supplementary literature referred to in the paper is listed in 
the References section. 
III. THE CORE ANALYSIS  
A. THE CRISES IMPACT ON THE PRE-CRISIS FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 
When risks gradually built up during the credit bubble and materialized in what was considered 
as the worst financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression (Reuters), a global financial 
system was well in place, covering private sector financial institutions, nations that have supervi-
sory jurisdiction over private financial institutions, and international institutions through which 
the national authorities coordinate and cooperate at a global level. What the global crisis managed 
to reveal were regulatory failures and deficiencies of that architecture in the way certain interna-
tional banks managed their business and risks (Mersch, 2010 p. 3).  
Several factors have been hold responsible: 
1. PURELY NATIONAL-ORIENTED PATCHWORK ARCHITECTURE 
 The pre-crisis framework was just a patchwork architecture arbitrarily agglomerated over time in 
reaction tthat emerged; it was flawed both in its implementation and in its structure (Schina-
si,Truman, 2010 p. 2). 
 Frameworks built on predominantly national basis (Mersch, 2010 p. 4) failed when called upon 
to resolve cross-border problems. 
2. DEREGULATORY AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE TENDENCIES 
Deregulatory measures, particularly in the Clinton and Bush eras (1993–2009), to ease regulatory 
burden led changes of the financial system laws, weakening of their enforcement, and undermin-
ing the regulatory framework. To mention a few US examples: 
 Restrictions on banks' financial practices were dropped in the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, banks’ lending powers extended, and the deposit 
insurance limit was raised from $40,000 to $100,000, thus contributing to the problem of 
moral hazard (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1997). 
 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, signed into Law in November 1999, dismantling the 1933 
Glass-Steagall Act and reducing the separation between commercial banks (which traditional-
ly had a conservative culture) and investment banks (which had a more risk-taking culture).  
 In 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) upon the request of major in-
vestment banks changed what was known as the “net capital rule”, which limited the amount 
of debt they could take on. In loosening the capital rules, the SEC not only allowed for fueling 
the growth in mortgage-backed securities supporting subprime mortgages, but also decided to 
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rely on these firms’ own computer simulations to determine the riskiness of investments, thus 
further contributed to the crisis (Labaton, 2008). 
 Supported by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, the self-regulation of the over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives market was admitted by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000. This deregulation led to a boost of innovative derivatives such as credit default swaps 
(CDS), used for speculation against particular credit risks: first traded in the late 1990, the no-
tional outstanding amount of CDS increased from approximately USD 10 to 40 trillion, i.e. by a 
factor of four, in the two years between June 2005 and June 2007, to reach a record of USD 62 
trillion December 2007 (according to the half-yearly BIS OTC derivative statistics). In the end, 
the financial crisis revealed the financial vulnerabilities associated with these instruments. 
3. UNDERDEVELOPED CRISIS PREVENTION 
Not spotting the crisis appropriately ahead of time was not just an intellectual failure; it was also 
partly a failure of machinery (Tucker, 2010 p. 1). While achieving progress in areas such as setting 
standards (e.g. capital requirements standards), no common policy was put in place for crisis man-
agement, especially for early action.  
In the EU, for instance, crisis management was reduced rather to information sharing, or allocation 
of responsibilities (e.g. wide degree of central banks’ involvement in national liquidity surveil-
lance). Incoherent national approaches to tackle failures of financial institutions (most EU member 
states have only a few bank-specific regulations, and revert to general commerce bankruptcy laws 
resulting in procedural delays, even prohibiting in some cases the recapitalization of insolvent 
banks; some countries focus on the right of claimholders, others on the right of debtors; moreover, 
deposit insurance regulation varies among countries) opposed coordinated remedial action, based 
on early intervention and rapid decision-making.  
One important lesson for global governance emerging from the crisis is that the international communi-
ty lacks a set of ex-ante burden-sharing mechanisms for resolving the weaknesses or insolvencies of 
large, complex, interconnected financial conglomerates (Schinasi and Truman, 2010 p. 2). 
A simplified overview of the pre-crisis framework for safeguarding global financial stability covering 
four important sources of global systemic financial risk (Global financial institutions, Global markets, 
Unregulated financial activities, Economic and financial stability policy mistakes) and the relevant 
lines of defense against them (Market discipline, Financial regulations, Micro-prudential supervision 
of financial institutions and products, Macro-prudential supervision of markets and the financial sys-
tem as a whole, Crisis management and resolution) is attached in the Appendices. 
B. PROPOSALS IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Against this background, it is not surprising that the regulatory system was in the pillory for having failed 
to mitigate the recent cycle in leverage, credit expansion and housing prices. It gave rise to widespread 
calls for changes in the regulatory system by politicians and business leaders, economists and the media. 
1. PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISKS 
Against the background that financial firms are much more susceptible to systemic risks than non-
financial firms, Bullard, Neely and Wheelock from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis have taken 
up several proposals how to control and mitigate systematic risks in the financial system, which were 
published in the economic literature, and identified four broad and closely related areas for considering 
reforms of the global financial architecture (Bullard, Neely and Wheelock, 2010): 
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a. Increased and broader supervision, amongst others 
- Creation of a financial regulator with responsibility for macro-prudential oversight of the 
financial system, especially of unregulated activity, and 
- Increased supervision of Systemically Important Financial Institutions SIFIs or “Too Big 
to Fail Institutions (TBTF) under the umbrella of a systemic regulator ; 
b. Offset excessive risk-taking leading to moral hazard, notably explicit or implicit government guaran-
tees, such as government bail-outs; 
c. Mitigate systematic risks, amongst others 
- strengthening the imposition of minimum requirements for capital on large financial firms, 
- limiting the use of leverage, regulating particularly the use of short-term debt to finance holdings 
of long-term assets, and  
- modifying market value accounting rules; 
d. Resolve crisis management, corrective action, and resolution of large, complex financial institutions, in-
cluding appropriate reductions in payments for bondholders given the unequal treatment of equity capital. 
All of these recommendations will be part of actual reform measures outlined in the following sections.  
Among the large variety of further proposals addressing regulatory issues subject to reform, only a few 
shall be mentioned, due to the restricted scope of this paper: 
2. REGULATORY REVIEW OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND TRANSPARENCY  
Lucian Orlowski has recommended, amongst others, regulating derivative instruments, subjecting trades 
in complex derivatives to central clearing, as well as putting off balance sheet financing under regulatory 
and supervisory scrutiny regarding transparency and  minimum capital holdings (Orlowski, 2009).  
3. EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION 
Reforming executive remuneration is among the solutions outlined by Nobel prize winner Joseph Stiglitz: 
notably mitigate the incentives for excessive risk-taking and the short-term focus by extending the refer-
ence basis - in addition to reducing the scope for conflicts of interest and improving shareholder informa-
tion about dilution in share value as a result of stock options (Stiglitz, 2008) 
4. PRUDENTIAL LIMITS ON SHADOW BANKS 
Against the background of the rise of the shadow banking system at the bottom of the crisis another No-
bel laureate Paul Krugman proclaimed the rule: anything that does what a bank does, anything that has to 
be rescued in crises the way banks are, should be regulated like a bank (Krugman, 2009). 
C. KEY POST-CRISIS FINANCIAL REGULATION INITIATIVES 
Resulting from the increasingly interconnected nature of financial institutions and markets, the need 
for coordinated action and global forums to address comprehensive regulation by national and re-
gional regulators and supervisors was recognized. As the G8 as the principal forum for discussing 
such issues had proved to be inadequate, international bodies have come under scrutiny in the wake 
of the crisis and underwent a reform process. 
Since then, the intensity of the international cooperation on financial regulation has been stepped up 
and three years after the worst financial-economic crisis since the 1930s began; a new international fi-
nancial, regulatory and fiscal architecture has emerged, although incomplete, not yet implemented and 
inadequately coordinated between major countries. The primary actors for development policy debates 
were the UN and certain of their special organizations1, the EU, the G20, BCBS, BIZ, IMF, and IOSCO.  
Due to the limited scope, the focus of this paper is on the US, EU and G20 initiatives only. 
                                                          
1
 There is a UN "Interactive Panel on the Global Financial Crisis"', set up by the UN General Assembly. It held its first meeting 
in New York on 30 October 2008, led by Professor Joseph Stiglitz. It is involving a broader range of countries and lobbies for an 
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1. G20 
a. THE G20 SUMMITS 
Among the elements of the reforms were the creation of the G-20 summits in response both to 
the latest financial and economic crisis and to the lack of representation of the key emerging 
countries, and the shift from the G8 to the G20 as the new principal forum for global economic 
coordination and governance, as agreed upon at the Pittsburgh G20 Summit in September 2009. 
It is committed, among others, to implement the coordinated expansionary macroeconomic poli-
cies, and significantly enhance the financial regulations, notably by the establishment of the Fi-
nancial Stability Board (FSB) (see below). 
b. THE G20 AGENDA 
Accordingly, the G-20 Summits have been held in Washington in 2008, in London and Pitts-
burgh in 2009, and in Toronto and recently in Seoul in 2010.  
The first G20 summit in 2008 developed an extensive agenda for stabilizing the world economy 
and the financial system, with the aim of preventing future crises, mainly by improving global 
regulation and supervision, and strengthening of international financial institutions, including: 
Macro-prudential 
supervision and  
Systemic risk 
 Establish framework to deal with macro-prudential risks and 
develop tools; 
 International guidelines for definition of systemic importance, 
and avoidance regulatory arbitrage. 
Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions SIFIs 
 Improve oversight framework. 
Prudential Regulation, 
incl. Capital and 
Liquidity 
 Strengthen prudential regulatory standards; 
 Improve quantity and quality of bank capital; 
 Discourage excessive leverage; 
 Listen constructively to feedback & channel it to the right 
direction of change; 
 Strengthened liquidity requirements; 
 Adopt Basel capital framework. 
Bank resolution  Address cross-border resolution. 
Comprehensive Data  Ensure gathering relevant information and international consistency. 
Hedge Funds  Registration and conduct of business requirements. 
Derivatives  Improve OTC derivative markets; 
 Promote standardization and resilience of credit derivative markets; 
 Establish central clearing counterparties. 
Credit Rating Agencies  Registration; 
 Oversight rules. 
Accounting Standards  Strengthening compliance with international standards (especially 
in loosely regulated jurisdictions). 
Source: G20 summits communiqués  
c. THE G20 SUMMIT IN SEOUL ON 11 AND 12 NOVEMBER 2010 
The G20 agenda was constantly updated and extended (e.g. resolution regimes, corporate go-
vernance); the new structure was ratified at the G-20 Summit in Seoul, which marked the deli-
very of the following central elements of the reform program launched in Washington: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
agreement involving all members of the UN. Professor Joseph Stiglitz now (January 2009) being carried forward by a “Commis-
sion of Experts on Reform of the International Financial System”, also leads the panel’s work. 
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i. BANK CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY STANDARDS 
Aim: To reduce the likelihood and severity of future financial crises and create a less procyc-
lical banking system that is better able to support long-term economic growth, to substantial-
ly raise the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank capital and liquidity and to 
constrain the buildup of leverage and maturity mismatches; and to introduce capital buffers 
above the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times. 
Measures: Leaders endorsed the Basel III bank capital and liquidity framework. It has to imple-
mented into national legislation starting on 1 January 2013 and fully phased in by 1 January 2019. 
ii. INCREASED SUPERVISION TO MITIGATE RISKS OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (SIFIS) 
Aim: To provide the tools and the capacity to co-ordinate resolution across borders and respond to 
threatened failures of such firms without disruptions of the financial system and taxpayer exposure. 
Measures: Leaders also endorsed the policy framework, work processes, and timelines pro-
posed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to reduce the moral hazard risks posed by     
SIFIs, i.e. firms whose disorderly failure because of their size, complexity and systematic in-
terconnectedness would cause significant disruption of the “wider” financial system and eco-
nomic stability and address the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem. 
SIFIs and initially in particular financial institutions that are globally systemic (G-SIFIs) should have 
higher loss absorbency capacity to reflect the greater risk that the failure of these firms poses to the 
global financial system; more intensive supervisory oversight; robust core financial market infra-
structure to reduce contagion risk from individual failures; and other supplementary prudential and 
other requirements as determined by the national authorities which may include, in some circums-
tances, liquidity surcharges, tighter large exposure restrictions, levies and structural measures. 
Additionally, G-SIFIs will be subject to a sustained process of mandatory international recov-
ery and resolution planning. It was agreed reaction treaction trisk assessment on these firms 
through international supervisory colleges and negotiate institution-specific crisis cooperation 
agreements within crisis management groups. Regular peer reviews will be conducted by the 
FSB on the effectiveness and consistency of national policy measures for these firms. 
iii. SUPERVISORY INTENSITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Aim : As the Basel III and SIFI measures on their own are not sufficient enough to ensure 
that every country is up to the task of backing up the new regulations by effective risk as-
sessments and enforcement; it is necessary to empower supervisors to be able to detect prob-
lems proactively and to intervene early to reduce the impact of potential stresses on individu-
al firms and therefore on the financial system as a whole. 
Measures : Leaders reaffirmed their Toronto commitment to complete the new financial regu-
latory framework with more effective oversight and supervision and, endorsing the policy 
recommendations prepared by the FSB in consultation with the IMF, agreed to provide su-
pervisors with strong and unambiguous mandates, sufficient independence to act, appropriate 
resources, and a full set of tools and powers to proactively identify and address risks, includ-
ing regular stress testing and early intervention. 
iv. FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY / REGULATORY STANDARDS  
Furthermore, leaders committed themselves to a consensus on implementing the new archi-
tecture in an internationally consistent manner, including regulation of derivatives, compensa-
tion practices, accounting standards and reducing reliance on credit rating-agencies. 
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A very detailed report of the progress on the numerous economic and financial actions 
adopted by the London, Washington and Pittsburgh G20 Summits had been prepared by Ko-
rea, chairing the 2010 Seoul summit (G20 Progress report). 
The overview table in the Appendices shows the implementation status based on summaries pro-
vided by each of the G20 and EU countries as to where they are on the road to regulatory reform. 
d. ONGOING AND FUTURE G20 AGENDA 
In addition, the G20 indicated areas requiring greater attention in their future work, including: 
i. Macro-prudential policy frameworks: The FSB, the International Monetary Fund and the 
Bank for International Settlements have been invited to conduct further work in this area, in-
cluding tools to minimize the impact of excessive capital flows, in order to update the G20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at their next meeting.  
ii. Regulation and supervision of shadow banking: The FSB has been called on to collaborate 
with other international standard setting bodies in order to develop recommendations to 
strengthen regulation and oversight of the shadow banking system by mid-2011. 
iii. Regulation and supervision of commodity derivative markets: The International Organization 
of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) task force on commodity futures markets is expected to 
report to the FSB on this issue in April 2011.  
iv. Market integrity and efficiency: IOSCO has been invited by June 2011 to develop, and report 
to the FSB, recommendations to promote markets’ integrity and efficiency so as to minimize  
to the financial system by the latest technological developments. 
2. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (“FSB”) 
a. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND SCOPE 
The FSB represents the G-20 leaders' first major international institutional change. Established 
after the 2009 G-20 London summit in April 2009 as a successor to the Financial Stability Fo-
rum (FSF) with a broadened mandate, the FSB is designed as an international body that moni-
tors and makes recommendations about the global financial system. Bringing together national 
authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international financial centers, inter-
national financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervi-
sors, and committees of central bank experts, the Board of the Basle-based FSB includes all G-
20 major economies, FSF members, Spain, and the European Commission. Given the FSB’s 
role overseeing implementation of many of the G20 commitments and its working together with 
other bodies, the Secretary of the US Treasury Tim Geithner described the FSB as "in effect, a 
fourth pillar” of the architecture of global economic governance, alongside the IMF, the World 
Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO)” (Geithner, 2009). 
Though being fully supported from the IMF and the World Bank, FSB cannot work as it is ex-
pected to do with the current governance and resources, as none of its four committees and four 
working groups has permanent personnel. 
 
b.  FSB  REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS –  PRE-SEOUL  
The 2008 FBF/FSB recommendations to enhance the resilience of financial markets and institutions submit-
ted to the G7 Finance Ministers on 12 April 2008 comprised the same areas as for the G20 described above. 
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The FSB regularly reports to the G20 on progress achieved, the last detailed report on numerous economic 
and financial actions adopted on the G20 summits was prepared by Korea for to the 2010 Seoul summit.  
c.  FSB  ONGOING REFORM PROGRAMME –  POST-SEOUL  
According to a communiqué of the FSB Chairman to the G20 Leaders on 9 November, the  
focus for the ongoing reform programme after Seoul will consist of: 
i. Assessing the need to apply regulatory safeguards to shadow banking 
ii. Thematic peer reviews of risk disclosures and of mortgage underwriting practices  
iii. Review of deposit insurance standards. 
In addition, the FSB will, in cooperation with all the relevant bodies, focus attention on the fur-
ther development of macro-prudential policy frameworks, on emerging markets’ financial sta-
bility issues, as well as on commodity derivatives markets and market integrity. 
3.  US  
a. THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
In the U.S., the most important restructuring of U.S. financial regulation since the 1930s affect-
ing all Federal financial regulatory agencies and almost every aspect of the US financial servic-
es industry, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Franck 
Act) was signed into law by President Barack Obama on 21 July 2010 after months of tough ne-
gotiations between Congress, Senate and the Obama administration.  
Named after the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee lead-
ers due to their involvement with the bill, the implementation of the 848 pages and 16 titles re-
quires, according to a law firm’s count (Davis Polk, 2010), of regulators to create 243 rules, 
conduct 67 studies, and issue 22 periodic reports.  
The Dodd-Frank agenda aims to promote financial stability by measures depicted in the below key areas2: 
Promote Robust 
Supervision  
and  
Regulation of 
Financial Firms 
 Creating a new council of federal regulators, the Financial Services 
Oversight Council, led by the Treasury secretary, to evaluate, 
coordinate the detection and respond to emerging systemic risks, as well 
as to promote market discipline; 
 Subjecting large, interconnected financial firms to consolidated supervision 
and regulation, incl. stricter capital, liquidity and risk management standards; 
 Require hedge funds and private equity funds to register. 
Establish 
Comprehensive 
Regulation of 
Financial Markets 
 Expanding comprehensive federal banking and securities regulation 
from its focus on banks and public markets to a wider range of financial 
companies to be subjected to government oversight; 
 Imposing regulation, for the first time, on "shadow markets" like the 
enormous trade in credit derivatives; 
 Increasing transparency of derivatives by requiring most trading to take 
place through open marketplaces (through exchanges or clearinghouses), 
monitored by the SEC or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
Prudential 
Regulation, 
including 
Capital and 
Liquidity 
 Strengthen prudential regulatory standards; 
 Improve quantity and quality of bank capital; 
 Discourage excessive leverage; 
 Listen constructively to feedback & channel it to the right direction of change;
 Strengthened liquidity requirements; 
 Adopt Basel capital framework. 
                                                          
2
 Given the similar tenor, please refer to the G20 section for the rationale of this US legislation. 
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Protect Consumers 
and Investors from 
Financial Abuse 
 Strengthening investor protection by creating a powerful new regulator 
housed in the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, to shield consumers of financial products from abusive bank 
and financial services practices (whose first visible result, a simplified 
disclosure form for mortgage loans, is due in about two years). 
Provide Government 
with the Tools it 
Needs to Manage 
Financial Crises 
 Introducing tools for financial crises, including a "resolution regime" 
for Too-Big-To-Fail financial institutions, complementing the existing 
FDIC procedure, to allow for orderly winding down of failing firms,  
 Including a proposal that the Fed can receive authorization from the 
Treasury to extend credit in "unusual or exigent circumstances". 
Raise Intern. Regulatory 
Standards / Improve 
Intern. Cooperation 
 Tightening accounting standards; 
 Introducing shareholder value oriented compensation practices; 
 Subjecting credit-rating agencies to still-undetermined supervision. 
“Volcker Rule”  Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker’s proposal to restrict the ability of banks 
whose deposits are federally insured from trading for their own benefit. 
Source: US Treasury. Financial Regulation Reform: A New Foundation. 2009 Final Report  
While the measure does not fully restore the toughest restrictions imposed after the Great De-
pression, it is a clear turning point, highlighting a new distrust of Wall Street, fear of the in-
creasing complexity of technology-driven markets, and renewed government reliance to protect 
the consumer (New York Times, 4 November 2010). 
b. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
Despite these important advances, the Act leaves important issues unresolved which already had 
been debated in the wake of the crisis and before, such as: 
i. Rising number of supervisory institutions 
Contrary to the widely held belief that the US system of financial market oversight needed streamlin-
ing, a systematic overhaul of institutions to arrive at a more coherent and efficient oversight frame-
work was not feasible at a political level. While the Office of Thrift Supervision has been abolished 
and integrated into the Fed, additional Bureaus, Offices etc. have been added, leading to a patchwork 
of federal and state agencies involved in banking oversight with multiple and over-lapping mandates. 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research. EU Monitor 77 
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ii. Systemic issues 
How to identify systemic risks, and how to counter them effectively will be one of further is-
sues subject to continued debate.  
4.  EU 
Unlike the US all-in-one approach to meeting G20 provisions for new banking and financial 
regulation, the EU is taking a piecemeal approach.  
a. NEW EUROPEAN F INANCIAL SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK  
A review of existing EU financial supervisory arrangements was launched against the background 
that despite substantial integration of EU financial markets, regulation had remained fragmented 
among Member States, resulting in inconsistencies and inefficiencies in supervising financial insti-
tutions or managing the systemic risks at the cross-border level. Based on the recommendation of a 
high-level expert group, chaired by Jacques de Larosière in 2009 (the so-called Larosière Report of 
25 February 2009), the European Council agreed on the need to build a comprehensive cross-border 
framework for the prevention, management and resolution of financial crises in the EU.  
In September 2010, the EU passed a "Financial Supervision Reform" as of 2011 (EU Council 
Report: Financial Supervision Reform covering the following areas:  
 The text of the draft Regulations concerning the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and 
the European Banking Authority (EBA);  
 The alignment of the text of the draft Regulations establishing the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Author-
ity (EIOPA) on the text agreed for EBA, and  
 Certain outstanding issues relating to the EU Commission's proposal for a Directive amend-
ing a number of existing financial services directives (the "Omnibus Directive").  
New EU financial supervisory bodies are: 
i. European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
Purpose 
The ESRB is designed to be a new macro-prudential regulator for the financial sector 
throughout the EU. Its primary purpose is to act as an early warning system and provide 
oversight of the systemic risks against financial stability. 
Organization 
The president of European Central Bank (ECB) will chair the ESRB for the first five years; 
located in Frankfort at the ECB headquarter, its secretariat will also be provided by the ECB. 
Function and Powers 
The ESRB will develop common indicators to permit uniform ratings of the riskiness of spe-
cific cross-border financial institutions and to make it easier to identify the specific risks. In 
response to the risks identified, the ESRB can issue recommendations for remedial action and 
where appropriate, make them public. 
The ESRB will have to notify the European Parliament and the three ESAs of an imminent 
emergency (when adverse developments may seriously jeopardize the orderly functioning 
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system 
in the EU), subject to follow-up procedures. 
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ii. European Supervisory Authorities ESAs 
Purpose 
At micro-level, the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA will be created as pan-EU supervisory authori-
ties, and replace the existing coordinating committees CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS. They will 
be charged with oversight of the EU banking, securities and insurance markets. 
Organization 
The board of each ESA will be made up of national supervisors; they will be initially 
located in London (EBA), Paris (ESMA) and Frankfurt (EIOPA), and staffed with about 
40 to 60 people in the beginning.  
Function and powers 
The ESAs will take over all existing functions from the respective coordinating com-
mittees, which they replace, and be responsible for setting common supervisory rules 
to be applied by all competent authorities across the EU, to share information and 
coordinate harmonized and effective action by the colleges of supervisors and to arbi-
trate any disputes between the competent authorities. 
In principle, the ESAs will not have direct powers to supervise individual financial institutions 
or markets, except for the ESMA, which was granted direct supervisory powers over European 
credit rating agencies by the EU Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies.  
Exceptionally, however, the ESAs will be empowered to take decisions, which are di-
rectly applicable to individual financial institutions in cases of (a) manifest breach or 
non-application of EU law and (b) disagreement between the competent authorities of 
member states, as described below. 
The key functions and powers of the ESAs are: 
 Monitoring how national supervisors implement their obligations under EU laws and en-
forcement in case of non-compliance; 
 Imposing binding mediation on national supervisors in case of disagreement; 
 Power to temporarily prohibit or restrict financial activities or products; 
 Power to investigate to assess risk exposure; 
 Mandate to protect consumers. 
iii. Joint Committee of the ESAs 
A Joint Committee of the ESAs will be established to serve as a forum in which they coope-
rate and ensure cross-sectoral consistency in relation to:  
 financial conglomerates; 
 accounting and auditing; 
 micro-prudential analyses of cross-sectoral developments, risks and vulnerabilities for financial stability; 
 retail investment products; 
 anti-money laundering measures; 
 exchanging information and developing relationships with the ESRB. 
Although national supervisors will retain responsibility for supervision and enforcement in 
their jurisdiction, the proposals represent a significant move towards coordinating prudential 
regulatory rules and standards in the EU.  
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Source: ABBL Luxembourger Bankers Organization, Annual Report 2009, P. 13 
 
b. FRAMEWORK FOR CROSS-BORDER CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE BANKING SECTOR 
In October 2010, the EU Commission issued a crisis management communication that covers 
measures needed at all stages of a bank’s failure– from early intervention, resolution to insol-
vency reorganization, not only for national as well as cross-border insolvencies. Emphasis is 
on avoidance of public sector bail-outs and on facilitating private sector solutions without con-
tagion and without disruption of banking activities, including enhanced information exchanges 
and co-operation among supervisors. 
The implementation of this framework would pose significant challenges due to structure, 
functioning and scope of the European Union: obstacles to overcome are not only the hetero-
geneity of insolvency laws in the different Member States, the existence or not of bank-specific 
bankruptcy regulations, but also issues related to burden sharing, or intra-group asset transfers 
during periods of crisis. In this context, it may be more realistic to pave the way for a second 
best approach i.e. a nationally based framework for cross-border crisis management associated 
with a binding process for cooperation and information exchange (Mersch, 2010 p. 6). 
Furthermore, the EU Council endorsed the establishment of Cross Border Stability Groups for 
all large EU cross-border financial groups by mid 2011, accompanied by the signature of 
Cross-Border Cooperation Agreements. 
Due to the restricted scope of this paper, other key elements of the EU regulatory reform 
will be covered in the overview outlined in the following section. 
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D.  COMPARISON OF THE REGULATORY REFORMS OF THE G20,  THE EU  AND US 
This overview is based on research of documentation on the databases and official websites of the above-mentioned stakeholders, e.g. (the G20 Summits In-
formation Centers, the ECB website, the databases for the EU (www.financialstabilityboard.org/;www.europa.eu; www.gpo.gov/;www.banking.senate.gov etc.) 
AREA EU ACTION US ACTION G20/FSB ACT I O N  
CAPITAL  
& 
LIQUIDITY 
BASEL III, as adopted by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision at the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland in 2010, is 
under adoption in the EU, tightening ratios of core 
capital held to liabilities incurred to seven percent 
by 2015, and increasing the quality of the assets 
used to meet those ratios. The new system will also 
require of banks to build up reserves (“capital buf-
fers”) counter-cyclically during good times to be 
protected in bad times, a maximum leverage ratio, 
and proposed new minimum liquidity ratios for a 
stock of high quality liquid assets and for a more 
robust funding structure. The EU proposal rivising 
the Capital Requirement Directives (CRD IV) shall 
be presented in spring 2011. 
The Dodd-Franck Act does not make transposition 
of the Basle Agreement mandatory.  
The US agreed to implement Basel II; in December 
2007 US bank regulators published the rule for US 
implementation of Basel II (effective since April 
2008), covering only few core banks (>$250 billion 
consolidated total assets, or >$10 billion total on-
balance sheet foreign exposure), while Guidelines for 
application of the Supervisory Review Process are 
fewer and less detailed. The form of the next steps in 
Basle II implementation is still under discussion.  
Nevertheless, the US authorities have been active in 
the Basel III negations.  
Also awaiting confirmation if and when the trading-
book requirements will be implemented.  
By endorsing the Basel III capital and liquidity 
framework, the G20 has made a significant step 
forward in strengthening global standards. They 
include substantially higher minimum require-
ments for the highest quality capital (equity and 
retained earnings), the proposed counter-cyclical 
capital buffer, a maximum leverage ratio, and 
proposed new minimum liquidity ratios for a 
stock of high quality liquid assets and for a more 
robust funding structure.  
SUPERVISION 
& 
SYSTEMIC 
RISK  
Creation of macroeconomic oversight board Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), supported by 
the ECB, involving all of the EU, as well as 3 sec-
toral securities, banking and insurance authorities 
with significant powers to gather information and to 
coordinate activities of national supervisors. 
The ESRB will monitor risks to the financial sys-
tem as a whole and set out “early warnings” in the 
event of increased risk, and also provide non-
binding recommendations on how to deal with 
these risks.  
From a micro-prudential perspective, the ESFS will 
be a network of member state financial supervisors 
working in conjunction with the new EU-level su-
pervisors in the banking, insurance, and securities 
sectors to detect systemic risks in SIFIs. 
To head off future systemic risks, Creation of Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which must 
identify threats to financial stability, promote market 
discipline, and respond to emerging systemic risks. 
Meeting at least quarterly, the FSOC will include the 
Fed and other regulators and be presided over by the 
Treasury Secretary. A new Office of Financial Re-
search will facilitate generation and coordination of 
research bearing on financial stability for the FSOC. 
Slight consolidation of the regulatory patchwork 
reining the US dual banking system that dates back, 
in some cases, to the 19th century. 
Fed continues to “identify, measure, manage and 
mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United 
States” in conjunction with the FSOC; also to super-
vise +/- 35 of larger (>$50 billion assets) bank hold-
ing companies. 
The G20 is committed to addressing macro-
prudential risks to limit the build up of systemic 
risk and to empower regulators to gather relevant 
information on all material financial institutions, 
markets and instruments in order to assess the 
potential for failure or severe stress to contribute 
to systemic risk; the FSB itself has created a 
“Vulnerabilities Group”  
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AREA EU ACTION US ACTION G20/FSB ACT I O N  
SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT  
FINANCIAL  
INSTITUTIONS 
(SIFIS)   & 
CROSS-
BORDER 
CRISIS 
RESOLUTION 
An EU framework for crisis management in the 
financial sector will be discussed in 2011, targeting 
at preventative measures, early action to remedy 
problems and resolution tools for supervisors. 
The EU Commission considers that ex-ante cross-
border resolution funds funded by levy on banks and 
built on harmonized system of national funds, could 
be used to pay for the costs of future bank resolution. 
The new banking authority is supposed to ensure 
coordination of resolution.  
Member States continue to discuss a possible tax on 
financial institutions to recoup the costs of state 
support during the crisis. 
Fed's power is expanded to oversee the largest, 
most inter-connected financial institutions (now 
called “Tier 1 FHCs”) - even if they are not banks. 
Imposition of stricter prudential supervision stan-
dards and regulations, incl. higher capital and li-
quidity requirements, on financial services compa-
nies that are big enough or interconnected enough 
to put the entire economy at risk. 
The bill also creates a process for the government to 
liquidate failing companies at no cost to taxpayers, 
which is similar to the F.D.I.C. process for liquidat-
ing failed banks.  
G20 is committed to a policy framework to include 
cross-border resolution/orderly wind-down tools, 
strengthened prudential and supervisory require-
ments, and core financial-market infrastructures. 
Moreover, in setting out the broad policy frame-
work for addressing SIFIs, the FSB now refers to 
higher capital requirements applying ‘initially and 
in particular’ to Global SIFIs, thereby creating for 
the first time a distinction between globally active 
and domestic SIFIs. This introduces significant 
uncertainty for large global banks and could result 
in an unlevel playing field for globally active SIFIs 
competing in national markets with predominantly 
local SIFIs.  
SECURI- 
TIZATION 
Originators of all securitized positions required to 
retain at least 5% “skin in the game” to share some 
risk during the securitization process.  
Strict due diligence procedures for originators and 
investors. If an investor does not comply with the 
due-diligence rules, a capital penalty charge applies. 
Companies that issue products like mortgage-
backed securities are required to keep at least 5% of 
their issues so that they retain part of the risk.  
Requires issuers to provide more information about 
the assets backing the securities 
Originators should retain a part of the risk of the 
underlying asset. 
DERIVATIVES Proposal for a Regulation on derivatives adopted by 
the EU Commission on 15 September 2010, com-
prising risk, prudential and ownership requirements 
for central counterparties (CCPs), mandatory clear-
ing of eligible OTC derivatives with central coun-
terparties and trade repositories, imposing strict 
requirements for CCPs to ensure their safety and 
ensures unfettered access to data by European regu-
lators (trade repositories). The EU is not requiring 
derivatives traders to use a central clearinghouse; 
provisional plans envisage the new EU capital-
markets authority has to determine which products 
will be subject to mandatory central clearing. 
Higher capital requirements for non-CCP cleared 
transactions foreseen in CRD IV. 
Imposition of tighter restrictions on the largely 
unregulated derivatives market by requiring most 
derivatives to be traded through exchanges or cen-
tral clearinghouses, monitored by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission. 
Code of conduct for dealers and participants.  
Transparency of transactions through trade repositories. 
Banks are prohibited from in-house derivative op-
erations, except those related to interest-rate, for-
eign-exchange and high-quality credit swaps.  
Corporate end-users, however, are provisionally ex-
empt from margin, capital and clearing requirements. 
G20 commitments include standardization of 
contracts, mandatory central clearing of standard 
OTC, reporting to trade repositories. 
In Seoul, the G20 welcomed FSB market reform 
recommendations on the central clearing and 
trade reporting of OTC derivatives concerning 
standardization, central clearing, organized plat-
form trading, and reporting to trade repositories. 
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AREA EU ACTION US ACTION G20/FSB ACT I O N  
VOLCKER 
RULE / 
PROPRIETAR
Y TRADING 
 
/ 
After the House passed its bill, President Obama 
disclosed a proposal that he called after its proponent 
former Fed chairman Paul A. Volcker: His proposal 
aims at limiting the activities of banks in business 
that are considered particularly risky: it prohibits – 
with exemptions – any form of proprietary trading by 
banks (using their own money to place directional 
market bets that are unrelated to serving customer), 
prohibits banks from owning a hedge fund, acting as 
one,bans deposit taking institutions from investing 
more than 3% of their capital in hedge funds and 
private equity funds, restricts securitization under-
writing and imposes a concentration limit on mergers 
and acquisitions in the banking sector. 
 
/ 
HEDGE  
FUNDS 
The proposed Alternative Investment Fund Manag-
ers Directive, targeting Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, contains comprehensive new rules 
regarding the structure, registration, activities, mar-
keting, capital and liquidity requirements, deposita-
ries, remuneration, risk management, governance etc. 
Also market access of third country funds. After a 
political agreement of the European Parliament on 11 
Nov. 2010 and the formal approval by the Council in 
the next few weeks, the Directive should come into 
force in early 2011 and be transposed into national 
law and applied by Member States by 2013. 
All hedge funds that manage more than $100 mil-
lion have to register with the SEC and provide in-
formation about their trades and portfolios. The data 
will be shared with systematic risk regulator. 
Greater role for state supervisors. 
Hedge Funds must register with relevant authori-
ties and provide relevant and timely information, 
including on leverage. 
Hedge funds oversight to ensure that they have 
adequate risk management (London summit 
2009) 
INVESTOR / 
CONSUMER  
PROTECTION 
Limited to investor / consumer protection mandate 
within new EU sectoral supervision authorities, 
though further legislation related to corporate go-
vernance of financial firms and reform of market-
abuse directive anticipated. 
Creation of a new regulator, the independent Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau within the Fed 
with broad powers to write rules, but limited en-
forcement powers to banks and credit unions with 
assets of at least $10 billion; nonbank mortgage 
companies, including loan originators and servicers 
 
/ 
INSURANCE EU insurance regulation consolidated under “Sol-
vency II”, already developed before the crisis.  
Creation of Federal Insurance Office within Trea-
sury to streamline communication among state-
based insurance supervisors etc. 
 
/ 
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AREA EU ACTION US ACTION G20/FSB ACT I O N  
CREDIT  
RATING 
AGENCIES 
(CRAS) 
The EU Regulation on CRAs introducing mandato-
ry registration and supervision of CRA will be fully 
applied as of December 2010.  
A proposal to move the CRA supervision to the 
new EU Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 
which will have significant powers of inspection of 
CRA, activates is in progress. 
New rules require of CRA to publish their ratings 
methodologies and greater disclosure of informa-
tion to CRAs of rated entities. 
Consultation document on various issues, such as 
over-reliance on credit ratings by financial markets; 
sovereign debt ratings; lack of competition, includ-
ing the need for a EU rating agency; and reduction 
of conflict of interest due to the issuer-pays model. 
In 2007, the SEC approved CRA registration & over-
sight rules, consistent with the international Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) principles. 
The Dodd-Frank Act has strengthened provisions 
on accountability and transparency of CRAs. An 
Office of Credit Ratings within the SEC is created 
for specific CRA supervision. 
Provisions in the Act include rules to prevent that 
ABS issuers choose the CRA, possibly through a ran-
dom process. SEC will also set a mechanism to qualify 
CRAs to provide rating to structured finance products. 
Agencies are required to disclose their methodologies 
The Act introduces more stringent thresholds of 
evidence when bringing lawsuit against CRAs and 
CRA liability for reckless use of information. 
CRAs used for regulatory purposes are subjected 
to regulatory oversight, consistent with IOSCO. 
Enforcement of compliance by national authorities. 
Seoul: The Basel Committee had been expected to 
report by Oct. 2010 on reducing the reliance on 
credit ratings within the regulatory capital frame-
work. This has been delayed, but the G20 wel-
comed FSB’s more general recommendations to 
reduce requirements and references to credit rating 
assessments in laws and regulations, remove or 
replace them remove them or replace them by 
suitable alternative standards of credit worthiness 
and to generate a clear expectation that banks, 
institute. investors & other market participants do 
not rely solely or mechanistically on credit ratings.  
REMUNE- 
RATION 
Comprehensive new rules linked to capital re-
quirements for banks, copied over for non-UCITS 
investment funds. Bonuses are more closely linked 
to salaries, limiting cash values in bonuses, issuing 
bonuses in non-cash instruments such as shares and 
establishing a claw-back mechanism. The rules will 
apply in relation to bonuses paid after the rules have 
to be implemented at national level (by 1 January 
2011), regardless of when the bonus was awarded 
or the contractual arrangements were entered into. 
The US adopted a supervisory, not a regulatory ap-
proach with a public discussion of a Fed’s draft 
guidance on pay practices at banks to implement the 
FSB Principles /Standards, a review of 28 large 
banking organizations and the SEC adopting en-
hancements to compensation disclosure requirements 
for publicly-traded issuers in the US, as of Feb. 2010.
Shareholders get more say in selecting corporate 
board members, as well as an advisory vote on 
compensation and “golden parachute” severance 
packages. Executive compensation must be res-
cinded if based on inaccurate financial statements. 
However, no statutory are controls foreseen.  
G20 Commitment to aligning compensation with 
long-term value creation, not excessive risk-
taking, for example deferral of variable pay for 
senior executives, restrictions on compensation 
where necessary to rebuild capital base, and 
banded disclosure requirements. 
The FSB conducted its first peer group review in 
March 2010 of how countries have implemented 
these principles and will undertake a follow-up 
review in 2011. 
 
ACCOUN- 
TING 
STANDARDS 
The EU is officially committed to IFRS but has 
delayed endorsement of IFRS 9 approach on finan-
cial instruments due to pressure from certain mem-
ber-states. 
 
SEC has not taken a decision yet if and how to 
move to International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS) of the International Accounting Stan-
dards Board (IASB); a decision expected in 2011.  
SEC favors a full “fair value” model for financial 
instruments rather than the “mixed measurement” 
model (fair value, amortized cost) preferred by IFRS. 
G20 is committed to simplification of standards 
for financial instruments, clarity and consistency 
for international valuation standards, and move 
towards global standards for accounting. 
Seoul: The G20 encouraged IASB &FASB for more 
convergence in fin. instrument accounting standards 
by end of 2011. Though many countries converted 
to IFRS, there is still much divergence to US-GAAP. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ASSESSMENT OF CONVERGENCE OF THE 
G20/FSB, EU AND US REGULATORY REFORMS 
Three years after the crisis and two years after charging the newly empowered G20 with driving 
the reform of the international financial regulatory architecture, not only  high-level commitments 
have been made, but on the basis of the global framework endorsed by the G20 both the EU and 
US have progressed significantly with the adoption of new laws, regulations and structures. Given 
differences in approaches, diverging historical and institutional background and national discre-
tion, it will be interesting to analyze the degree of convergence of outcomes. 
A.  CAPITAL &  LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BANKS 
The latest Basel III Agreement (September 2010) on levels and components of core capital and li-
quidity requirement for banks, endorsed by the G20 in Seoul, should result in significant changes 
and, optimistically, greater convergence in run-up to 2013 deadline for capital rules and securitiza-
tion positions. However, the G20 considers that the long transitional periods for the new standards 
may unintentionally allow fractures to occur in international consistency, as markets and some 
regulators will press firms for more rapid implementation.  
The option for regulators to exceed the minimum requirements may scatter the level playing field. 
The partial implementation of Basle II - only few core banks have to apply Basel II with fewer and 
less detailed Guidelines up to now - undermines convergence. Recently, a 24-line section of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which requires regulators to remove all references to credit ratings of securities 
from their rules, is blamed for delaying the US implementation of the Basel committee on banking 
supervision standards on how much capital banks need to hold against such assets in their trading 
books, as these standards rely on such ratings (Onaran, 2010). 
Given these delays and current public attacks of the new standards (amongst others, Citibank CEO 
Vikram Pandit at the at the Buttonwood Gathering in New York this October) (Guerrera/Pimlott, 
2010), remains to be seen to what extent Basel III will be implemented in the USA, despite the fact 
that US authorities have been active in the negotiation of the final agreement of Basle III. 
B.  SUPERVISION AND SYSTEMIC RISK  
Generally speaking, the US institutional reforms focus on improving existing structures, whereas 
the EU pursues a systematic overhaul of its institutional and procedural framework. 
As the creation of the FSOC mirrors that of the ESRB, there is convergence as to the constitution of 
macro-systemic monitoring bodies, but divergence in respect to the proceeding of micro-level su-
pervision: sectoral (3 supervisory authorities) in the EU versus systemic approach in the US. 
However, in the US the supervisory authorities will have at federal level more powers, e.g. to deal 
with systemic risks; stricter rules concerning transparency requirements, equity ratio, liquidity 
provisions as well as risk management can be imposed on any financial institution, including non-
banks, which are considered to be of systemic relevance. 
As efforts to arrive at one single regulator for the banks were politically not enforceable, equip-
ping the Federal Reserve with additional responsibilities for systemically important institutions 
risks an overlapping of tasks and uncertainty about the location of ultimate responsibility for su-
pervision - in contrast to clear lines of responsibility in the EU.  
C. SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (SIFIS) / CROSS-BORDER CRISIS RESOLUTION 
Though the Basel Committee did not meet the G20 deadline to put forward detailed proposals on 
additional regulatory requirements for SIFIs, there is large convergence on the necessity of 
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putting in place a process to solve the “too big to fail” phenomenon for large, interconnected 
firms whose failure threatens to bring down the financial system. Divergence, however, prevails 
whether this should be an ex-post levy (US approach) or an ex-ante resolution funding by levy on 
banks (EU Commission, but resistance among some member-states). 
In favor of the US system of ex-post funding for liquidation speaks that its administration seems 
less complex as that of a pre-funded resolution fund and that this approach raised less expectation 
among investors to be bailed out (reduction of moral hazard).  
According to opposite view the ex-ante approach is rather discouraging moral hazard (in that way the 
Luxembourgish Central Bank Governor Yves Mersch) as funds are part of the set of tools of a financial 
stability framework that includes crisis management, thus prevent moral hazard3 (Mersch, 2010 pp. 6/7). 
D.  SECURITIZATION  
The adopted rules are equivalent. Stricter rules for securitization positions were one of the first 
legislative reactions of the EU to the crisis. The US followed, but solely applied the holdback of 
5% of issues to be maintained for “subprime” mortgage-backed assets. 
This primary focus on the “crisis” issue in the form of “subprime” MBS shows the much narrower 
scope of the US approach and leads to a considerable divergence in application of US and EU rules. 
E.  DERIVATIVES  
The G20 stressed the importance of internationally consistent implementation of the OTC deriva-
tives rules in order to minimize the potential for regulatory arbitrage. However, with so many de-
tails as to scope and reach of new rules that still to emerge from separate US and EU approaches, 
this risks to continue to be an area of policy divergence. 
Though there is divergence between the two approaches – the US focusing on contracts, the EU focus-
ing on actors – the outcome is similar, notably both reforms require mandatory clearing for OTC de-
rivatives. More ambitious plans to separate derivatives from banking in the US were not enforceable. 
However, on the trading side OTC derivatives are less regulated in the US.  
In the EU, all OTC derivatives brokers are subject to MiFID authorization and supervision, cover-
ing conduct of business rules, capital and organizational requirements. In the EU, some transpa-
rency requirements will be "upgraded", while the US will just regulate "major swap dealers", 
which is only one part of OTC trading. 
There is some concern in the US regarding the separation of supervision between two agencies, 
the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
F.  VOLCKER RULE /  PROPRIETARY TRADING  
There is no equivalent of the Volcker rule in the G20 commitment.  
Nor has the European Union so far considered binding prohibitions such as proprietary trading or 
limitations of business activities due to the EU’s attachment to the universal bank model and its 
conviction that prudential stability can be ensured through other means. 
A stricter version of this rule, which would have completely prohibited links between banks and 
hedge funds, fell prey to negotiations in the US conference committee. 
                                                          
3
 In Luxembourg, the Central Bank has suggested an innovative framework for an ex-ante bank resolution fund through the establishment of 
a privately pre-funded structure covering both issues of an orderly resolution, i.e Deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) and Bank resolution fund. 
In order to avoid any conflict of interest or misallocation of DGS reserves, this shall be an earmarked component of the fund. In addition, 
this framework is designed such that liquidity constraints taking effect during a transitional period would be minimized in order to safeguard 
the flow of capital into the bank resolution fund. This can be ensured via a dual mechanism, which allows for the substitution of loans 
granted to the fund by the purchasing of an equivalent amount of bonds issued by contributing credit institutions. 
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G.  HEDGE FUNDS 
The G20 commitments are the basis of both the EU and the US regulations. 
Thus, there is a large convergence between the two approaches, such as the requirement to regis-
ter and provide systemic risk information. While the EU regulation of hedge funds is still under 
negotiation within the EU, regulation of the complex structures of the industry already appears 
more detailed in comparison to the US, - some argue even “excessive” -, in particular in relation 
to the protection of the investors. However, large hedge funds of systemic nature in the US may 
also be submitted to more stringent supervision of the SEC empowered to introduce more detailed 
requirements as necessary. A final comparison and assessment of conversion will not be possible 
until the AIFM Directive has been finalized. 
Afraid of protectionist moves that exceed the G20 commitments, the Obama administration is said to 
be closely monitoring the EU’s legislative procedure of Alternative Investment Fund Managers Di-
rective and its requirements for the EU-passport allowing non-EU (e.g. US) hedge/private equity 
funds to act in the 27 EU nation block on the basis of one single registration in one EU country.  
H.  INVESTOR /  CONSUMER PROTECTION  
The US is showing strong lead in the consumer protection segment with the creation of an entirely 
new institution, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). However, rulings by the new 
watchdog in the banking and financial institutions segment risk to conflict with prudential supervi-
sion concerns, given its limitation to the banking sector (for banks with assets above USD10 billion) 
and for some other financial institutions more in contact with consumers (mortgage banks, student 
loan institutions, etc.), while investment services and insurance will be outside its scope. 
In the EU where consumer protection is of national competence in the hands of EU Member States, 
the creation of an EU body similar to US watchdog is not feasible in short term, also because the in-
dividual national laws not harmonized. 
On the other hand, the main argument used in favor of the creation of the CFPB - that until now 
the various regulatory bodies had put consumer protection as a secondary objective of their activi-
ty - is also valid in Europe; therefore, the new sectoral EU Supervisory Authorities will have a 
mandate to protect consumers of financial services. 
I.  CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (CRAs) 
The FSB is leading work in order to “reduce the extent to which credit rating agency ratings are 
inscribed into, or embedded in the regulatory fabric of our capital markets” (Tucker, 2010 p. 3).  
Between the US and the EU, there is convergence on greater transparency and specific supervi-
sion of CRAs, but differences regarding to strategic approaches, rules and liability: 
 The US aims at reducing overall reliance on ratings for investment decisions.  
 The EU’s intention is to bring the reflection even further, looking also at ways to enhance 
competition for “Big 3” CRAs and the way sovereign debt is rated. 
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act has strengthened the legislation (e.g. provisions on accountability 
and transparency of CRAs, quality of ratings, disclosure and conflict of interests) in order to bring 
it in line with the EU legislation, and this should allow for granting equivalence.  
Overall, while regulating CRAs will not improve their forecasts, there would be potential for con-
flict of interest since governments are large-scale issuers of debt.  
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J. REMUNERATION 
Critics will say that in reality the FSB Principles have made little difference to levels of remune-
ration (KPMG, 2010). Maintaining a supervisory approach, not a regulatory approach, the Dodd-
Frank Act addresses the compensation issue by means of establishing broad principles aimed at 
balancing risks and rewards and getting shareholders more involved in the decision on compensa-
tion schemes – without introducing significant controls on remuneration of financial managers. 
Thus, the new US rules are unlikely to address the negative role remuneration practices played in 
encouraging risky behavior by bankers e.g. by deferring compensation to a sort of  debt contract, 
so that the managers and workers in large firms eventually become creditors of the firm and so 
they themselves have the same risks as other debt holders (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
The EU rules currently under negotiation are likely to be more detailed, including rules on salary 
composition, variable components, and deferral conditions.  
K.  ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
The Dodd-Frank Act does not cover the issue of accounting standards, where the U.S. has not yet deli-
vered on the G20 commitment to adopt the internationally agreed IFRS standards,. Convergence still is 
possible in 2011, but different views on accounting for financial instruments makes that difficult. 
The EU approach of consistently adhering to international standards on bank capital, financial re-
porting requirements, and securities markets in line with G20 commitments, creates a level play-
ing field for investors, and reduces the risks from regulatory arbitrage. 
L.  INSURANCE 
Despite creation of a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) with minor enforcement powers, the US in-
surance regulation will remain almost exclusively under State supervision.  
While in the US a centralized federal insurance regulation approach is not even in view for insurance 
regulation and supervision, the EU is far ahead discussing economic risk-based solvency requirements 
in the 2009 launched Solvency II Directive and updating consolidated supervision of financial institu-
tions with insurance, deposit and credit activities covered by the Financial Conglomerates Directive.  
V. WHAT REMAINS UNDER DISCUSSION 
Although progress has been made against the challenges set by the G20 principles of the reform 
package, further progress is needed. To pick out just a few of the multiple issues under discussion: 
A.  FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TAX  
In Europe, prominently Germany, France and Austria advocate for the introduction of a tax on financial 
transactions, a concept was originally dreamed up by US Nobel Laureate economist James Tobin in the 
early 1970s, and was initially devised as a tax on currency trading as a means of reducing volatility. Al-
though the proposal has not met with approval at the 2010 G20 Summit in Toronto, the proponents con-
tinue to move in that direction, considering the possibility of a Euro zone-only financial transaction tax, 
if a deal amongst the full EU-27 proved impossible. However, European Central Bank President Jean-
Claude Trichet put a damper on the project, stating that such a financial transaction tax could only work 
globally in order not to hurt the competitiveness of the European financial services industry. 
B.  SHORT SELLING  
The EU is supposed to propose a draft Regulation on short selling in which the ESMA shall be giv-
en emergency powers to ban short selling temporarily for three months in shares, sovereign bonds, 
derivatives relating to sovereign bonds and credit default swaps linked to government bonds.  
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As these restrictions would go beyond those in the US and other financial centers, they would 
risk to distort capital movements between the EU and third countries as transactions might be di-
verted into non-EU jurisdictions, thus diminishing the EU’s competitive capacity.  
C. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE FSB  
Given the continuing challenges for financial stability and ongoing necessity for regulatory reform, 
the FSB in his current organizational set up cannot work as it is expected to do. It should therefore be 
financed and staffed based on an international treaty, and furnished with minimum compliance me-
chanism such as peer review and surveillance as part of its founding documents. It should also be au-
thorized to convert international standards into international treaties, which should not be obstructed 
by the consensus process. Without being set up as real staffed international institute to coordinate the 
way to the stable international financial system, the FSB risks to wither out (Jeong, 2010).  
Overall, as globally coordinated standards are vital to ensure stability in the financial markets, we 
should strive for more bilateral consultations and yet closer coordination all new policy measures 
in the area of financial market regulation of national, bilateral or international dimension. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
 The global financial and economic crisis highlighted the interconnectedness of the global finan-
cial system and increased awareness of systemic risk as a perpetual threat to the entire system. 
 Cross-border financial activities have played a positive role in the process of globalization. At the 
same time, they have enhanced the need for ever-closer cooperation among competent authorities. 
 In the process of tackling regulatory weaknesses, developing international cooperation was a hall-
mark for triggering reforms to prevent future crises, notably via the G20 platform. 
 Though not addressing other macro-economic issues in response to the crisis beyond the 
framework of macro-prudential oversight, these G20 reform commitments served as a sound 
foundation. However, their soft design, reflecting diverging political and economic interest 
within the G20, has left ample room for individual states’ maneuvers when implementing the 
policies into national law. 
 Alongside carpentering the G20 architecture, both the US and the EU have progressed visibly 
(the US with the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act and in the EU with the agreement on the su-
pervision package), but with differences in pace (the US as first mover, while the EU is await-
ing the proposals to be made by the global-level) and emphasis (driven by concerns to main-
tain competitiveness e.g. in the areas of capital adequacy and liquidity or SIFIs).  
- With the Dodd-Frank Act, the US has set the pace and an important regulatory response to the crisis 
addressing all priorities and key issues identified and agreed in conjunction with its partners in the G20.  
- The EU’s new architecture is a significant first major move towards an effective trans-EU regula-
tory structure since the creation of the ECB. In comparison, the Dodd-Frank legislation is more a 
reshuffling of the regulatory patchwork and may not address the underlying structural problems.  
The decisive factor is now implementation and further enhancement of the reform packages. 
 Without the crash, none of this new architecture would have emerged. Thus, one can look at it 
that way that the crisis has produced a first progress so far. 
 Given the global dimension, there is concern that stability and regulatory reforms might, in the end, 
incite by‐passing and push financial markets away from the Europe and the US towards less regu-
lated playing fields. However, as only appropriately regulated markets provide a safe haven, the fi-
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nancial reform regulation might even attract market players, as long as it is not distorting and does 
not hinder banks flexibility and initiatives. 
 The dynamic nature of financial markets and the information asymmetry between regulators and 
financial institutions will require continuously improved transparency and more effective supervi-
sion of financial institutions.  
 Also, as one central lesson of this crisis learnt is that financial and supervisory authorities and regu-
latory bodies will need to act more speedily and coherently than in the past, this will require ongo-
ing monitoring of emerging risks and regulatory weaknesses, co-ordination in regulatory and su-
pervisory matters and political accountability for defining and implementing mitigating actions. 
 While Basel III has been a efficient step in the right direction of risk management, another facets 
are vital to get to the heart of the matter, e.g. accuracy and transparency of financial service provid-
ers’ financial statements as well as diminishing the use of off-balance sheet activities and properly 
reporting thereof (Orlowski, 2010). 
 While there is hardly any hope to prevent crises in the future completely, maybe there is the chance 
to reduce them by implementing better regulation - in view of that “Unknown unknowns” 4might 
cause the next crisis. 
  
                                                          4
 There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't 
know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know. (Donald Rumsfeld) 
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APPENDIX 1 
PR E -C R I S I S  F R A M E W O R K   
F O R  S A F E G U A R D I N G   
G L O B A L  F I N A N C I A L  S T A B I L I T Y  
 
 
This simplified overview of the pre-crisis framework for safeguarding global financial stability covers  
 the four important sources of global systemic financial risk. 
 Global financial Institutions,  
 Global markets,  
 Unregulated financial activities, and 
 Economic and financial stability policy mistakes,  and  
 the lines of defense against them:  
 Market discipline,  
 Financial regulations,  
 Microprudential supervision of financial institutions and products,  
 Macroprudential supervision of markets and the financial system as a whole, and 
 Crisis management and resolution. 
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 APPENDIX 2 
P R O G R E S S  O N  G20  F I N A N C I A L  R E G U L A T I O N  R E F O R M   
 
The following table is based on summaries provided by each of the G20 and EU countries as to where they are on the road to regulatory reform (Source PWC). 
Country Progress on G20 Financial Regulation Reform 
Argentina  Measures to increase financial sector soundness and update the regulation of risk management practices. 
 Measures to facilitate widespread access to the banking system, particularly for low-income households. 
Australia As financial market conditions have normalized, bank funding guarantee has been withdrawn and withdrawal of a sub-
national government borrowing guarantee announced. 
 FSB scheduled to undertake a peer review of Australia’s financial system in 2011. 
 Commitment to adopt enhanced international capital and liquidity standards (Basel III). 
 Strengthened the executive remuneration framework. 
 Established independent regulatory arrangements for formerly self-supervised markets. 
 Reforms announced to improve quality of financial advice. 
 Announced tax reform to support further competition from foreign financial institutions in the domestic market. 
Brazil  All financial institutions are required to allocate capital according to standardized approaches for credit, market and 
operational risks as recommended by BCBS. Capital requirements for market risk were amended to include the use of 
stressed VaR parameters. 
 The introduction of advanced approaches for capital requirement is under way and will be complete by 2013 
 While already applying prudential parameters that are quite strict, Brazil intends to promptly adopt the revised Basel III 
standards. The same applies for FSB’s compensation principles. 
 Initiatives to further deepen and make banking services more broadly available to society. 
Canada  Continued effective risk-based prudential regulation & supervision, incl. regular 5 year review reviews of regulatory framework. 
 Transition to a Canadian Securities Regulator with participating provinces and territories. 
 Committed to implement agreed-upon G20 financial sector reforms by established deadlines. 
China  China will improve instruments & means for macro-prudential policies, a regulatory regime for SIFIs, & the financial safety net. 
 Ongoing work to set up leverage ratio and liquidity requirements in banks; reform capital markets, including improving 
institutional infrastructure and investor structure; introduce risk-based capital requirement in the insurance sector; and 
strengthen convergence with international accounting standards. 
EU Financial sector initiatives include: 
 The creation of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility 
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Country Progress on G20 Financial Regulation Reform 
(EFSF) to address tensions in the sovereign debt markets in the euro area. 
 Stress tests to increase transparency and accelerate financial repair. 
 A supervisory package to establish a European systemic regulator and three European supervisory authorities to monitor 
financial markets, safeguard stability, and improve supervision of cross border entities. 
 A comprehensive regulatory reform programme incl. microprudential issues to improve efficiency of fin. markets & safeguard stability. 
France  Adoption of G20 compensation principles, enhanced capital requirements, committed to a systemic levy to protect 
taxpayers from the costs of resolving distressed financial institutions. 
 New regulation to promote responsible consumer lending. 
 Renewed European regulatory and supervisory framework. 
 Creation of the French Prudential Authority and extension of the French Securities Market Authority’s power and scope. 
Germany Measures to improve financial stability include: 
 Implementation of the EU Regulation on Rating Agencies 
 Prohibition of naked short sales of German shares and of government debt issuances in the Euro zone  
 Prohibiting trade in Credit Default Swaps on government bonds in the Euro zone, except for hedging purposes 
 Implementation of the FSB remuneration standards for financial institutions developed on the basis of G20 resolutions. 
India  Monetary policy responses have been calibrated with an objective of price stability while sustaining a growth recovery 
in the broader context of persistent global uncertainty. 
 A Financial Stability & Development Council (FSDC) will be created to improve inter-regulatory agency coordination, 
and promote financial stability. 
 India has announced the creation of a financial sector legislative commission that will rewrite and clean up financial sector laws. 
 India has requested a joint IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme. 
 The Reserve Bank of India has issued guidelines based on FSB compensation principles for the private sector and foreign banks. 
 India is making progress in a number of areas of the G-20’s financial sector reform agenda, including the adoption of 
Basel capital adequacy norms, convergence with international financial reporting standards, development of a roadmap 
for adopting a cross-border supervision framework, finalization of guidelines on OTC foreign exchange derivatives, and 
the development of guidelines on the introduction of CDS for corporate bonds. 
 The interest rate regime has been largely deregulated in order to achieve better price discovery and efficient resource allocation. 
Indonesia  Participates in Financial Sector Assessment Program & prepares action plans to strengthen adherence to int. standards based on the FSAP results. 
 Complete implementation of Basel II with adjustments to this regulatory regime following the final BCBS proposal to 
strengthen global capital and liquidity standards (Basel III). 
 Supplement the regulatory policy on prudential requirement with the power of respective regulators to impose 
additional requirements on specific financial institutions. 
 Applying risk-based supervision method for all regulated entities with more frequent audit activities. 
 Seek to pass the Financial System Safety Net Law to strengthen financial regulation and supervision. 
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Country Progress on G20 Financial Regulation Reform 
 Establish stricter prudential regulations and stronger monitoring of important financial institutions. 
Italy Strong measures have been adopted to strengthen and support the financial sector, even though it has not been heavily 
affected by the crisis due to effective supervision: 
 At national level, specific rules have been issued by the Bank of Italy on remuneration practices to ensure their 
consistency with sound and prudent management and the Government has been recently delegated by the Parliament to 
ensure full transparency in this field by listed companies. 
 In addition, measures have been implemented to support households’ home loans, the provision of financing and capital to 
businesses, in particular SMEs and for investment in research and innovation, and more effective consumer finance supervision. 
 Within the EU, firm action has been taken to preserve stability and ensure market functioning, through the creation of the 
European Financial Stability and Mechanism and the approval of the supervisory package. 
Japan  The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, etc. amended in May mainly to : (i) improve the stability and transparency of the 
settlement of OTC derivatives transactions, and (2) strengthen group-wide regulation and supervision. 
Korea The Government is taking financial reform measures to enhance financial stability and create a sound and resilient 
financial system. Improving financial regulatory and supervisory system by: 
 Implementing the "Guideline for the Compensation Principles“. 
 Adopting the international financial reporting standards as of Jan 1, 2011. 
 Establishing Central Counterparties by 2012. 
 Aligning capital regulation measures with the BCBS decisions. 
 Preparing for SIFI regulation in line with international standards. 
 Developing financial market and industry by: working on related legislations such as “Financial Institution Governance 
Act "and “Financial Consumer Protection Act” and 
 Facilitating the long-term bond market by resuming the issuance of inflation-linked Treasury Bonds in 2010. 
Mexico  Financial System Stability Board was created in July 2010. The board is designed as a coordination mechanism to 
oversee the stability of the Mexican financial system. 
 New Basel standards will be reached within the agreed timeframe. Mexico already complies with most of the capital adequacy requirements. 
 Plans to promote financial deepening through regulatory changes and measures to increase access to banking services. 
 Plans to expand regulatory perimeter to cover systemic non-bank entities. 
 Strengthen framework for bank bankruptcies. 
 Completed FSB peer review. 
Russia Russia is improving regulation and supervision of the financial sector in line with international standards and G-20 and FSB 
initiatives, taking into account national circumstances. It plans to take the following broad steps to develop its financial market: 
 Increase capacity and transparency of the financial market. 
 Ensure efficiency of the market infrastructure. 
 Form a favorable tax climate for financial market participants. 
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Country Progress on G20 Financial Regulation Reform 
 Improve legal regulation in the financial market. 
 Measures to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards and strengthen the remuneration framework in the state and private sectors. 
 Accreditation procedures for rating agencies. 
 Within the framework of establishing the International Financial Centre in Russia, work will continue to ensure the 
appropriate regulation of organized trading and clearing operations and clearing activity. 
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia’s FSAP update scheduled for 2011. 
 Issued Rules on Compensation to implement FSB Principles and Standards. 
 Regulatory reforms to further strengthen banking supervision are continuing. These include encouraging banks to adopt 
advanced approaches of Basel-II, strengthening of the stress testing process, conducting risk based on-site 
examinations, and updating prudential regulations. 
 Strengthening of market infrastructure by undertaking new initiatives in payment and settlement systems. 
South Africa Key objectives include: strengthening financial stability, broadening financial services for the poor; increasing 
competitiveness and efficiency; and promoting investor and consumer protection, including regulating credit ratings 
agencies and increased oversight of hedge fund and private equity industries. 
 Crisis contingency framework has been reviewed. 
Spain  A new regulation for the saving banks was passed in July. The reform gives them greater flexibility in access to capital resources. 
Besides, it makes corporate governance more professional and improves the representation of the stakeholders (in particular, elected 
positions and high level officials cannot be members of governing bodies. 
 The implementation of the Second reform of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD II) will improve prudential 
requirements on securitizations and large exposures. 
Turkey  Regulation and supervision of financial sector will be enhanced in line with international standards and EU actions 
 Istanbul International Financial Centre Strategy and Action Plan will be implemented decisively. 
 An FSAP update is scheduled for 2011. 
United 
Kingdom 
The government is taking firm action to reduce systemic risk in the UK financial sector: 
 The framework for financial regulation and supervision is being reformed through internationally-agreed measures on capital and liquidity 
and by providing the Bank of England with control of macro-prudential regulation and oversight of micro-prudential regulation. 
 A levy on banks’ balance sheets will be introduced from 1 January 2011 to encourage banks to adopt less risky funding profiles. 
 The government is also establishing an independent Banking Commission to consider reforms to the structure of 
banking in the UK and the state of competition in the industry. 
United StatesThe Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act includes a broad range of provisions within four broad reform objectives: 
 Strengthening supervision to reduce systemic risk and by closing gaps and loopholes in the regulatory regime, incl. SIFIs 
 Enhancing regulation of critical markets, including regulation of securitization markets. 
 Improving protection for consumers/investors through the creation of a consumer financial protection agency. 
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APPENDIX 3 
G 2 0  A G E N D A - I M P L E M E N T A T I O N  
I N  T H E  U S  A N D  T H E  E U  
 
 
The following table provides a detailed overview of legislative measures dealing with the implementing of 
the G20 agenda in the US and on the European union level. 
 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research 
